The Owl, the Goldfish and the Bull - The Question of the Animal and Romantic Poetry by Zhang, Hui
59
Between the SpecieS
Volume 20, Issue 1
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/
Summer, 2017
The Owl, the Goldfish and the Bull: 
The Question of the Animal and 
Romantic Poetry
ABSTRACT
This article argues that the representation of animals in Romantic 
poetry contributes to the contemporary philosophical and ethical 
discussion of the question of animals by providing a literary expres-
sion of the latter. Conversely, reading depictions of animals in Ro-
mantic poetry with their philosophical implications in mind throws 
light on the oppositions between different human groups, such as 
between Orientals and Occidentals, or between males and females, 
in Romantic poetry. These categories connect with each other in dif-
ferent ways in the works of three prominent Romantic poets: William 
Wordsworth, Lord Byron and Alexander Pushkin. Animals in their 
poetry reflect their views of various entities falling under the cat-
egory of the self and that of the other; and indicate the relationships 
of these entities with such concepts as language, difference, passivity 
and subjectivity. These concepts find their formulations in the con-
temporary philosopher Jacques Derrida’s writing on the question of 
the animals. My analysis will focus on three poems: Wordsworth’s 
“There was a Boy”, Byron’s “Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage,” and Push-
kin’s “The Fountain of Bakhchisaray.”. It will offer a reading of them 
side by side with Derrida’s essay “And Say the Animal Responded”.
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In Derrida’s essay, which is a part of his lecture titled “The 
Animal That Therefore I am (More to Follow)” (1997), he 
critiques Jacques Lacan’s rendering of the Cartesian human/
animal divide. He challenges Lacan’s thesis that “the animal 
has neither unconscious nor language, nor the other, except as 
an effect of the human order, that is, by contagion, appropria-
tion, domestication” (Wolfe 2003, 123). As Derrida sees it, this 
thesis follows the Cartesian tradition which attributes to the 
animal “a type of originary perfection” (Ibid., 124), a “fixity, 
within the presupposition of a code that only permits reactions 
to stimuli and not responses to questions” (Ibid.). It leads to the 
conclusion that the animal has code, but no language; can react, 
but not respond. In this essay I would like to discuss the forces 
and complexities of Derrida’s contentions by looking at how 
the question of animal as the “other” figures in the poetic form. 
Specifically, I wish to concentrate on the way Derrida’s decon-
structivist project directs our attention to the intricacies of the 
dynamics between self and other in the poetry of British and 
Russian Romantic traditions, on how the philosophical lexicon 
developed by him might be used in the literary context for a re-
newed understanding of the Romantic poets’ concern with the 
conditions of different life forms in their time. In the meantime 
I would like to contend that an analysis of the literary represen-
tations of animals in these texts serves to illustrate the different 
aspects of Derrida’s investigation, and that Derrida’s writing 
on animals provides critical insight into the exploration of both 
animal and human others by Romantic poets.
Derrida’s reevaluation of the human/animal dichotomy 
based on the standard of language evokes not only the ques-
tion of the other, but also that of the self. It continues the on-
tological investigation opened by Wittgenstein’s well-known 
statement that “if a lion could speak, we could not understand 
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him” (Wittgenstein 1968, 225), which both acknowledges the 
possibility of otherness and negates its accessibility and com-
prehensibility: On the one hand, the presumption of a “lion’s 
language” postulates that language could not be defined in 
such a way as to serve as the line that divides human from 
animals; on the other hand, the implication that a lion’s life 
operates in a “linguistic domain” (to use Maturana and Va-
rela’s terminology) that exists independently from the human 
domain prevents the human consciousness from grasping the 
lion’s life in the human language as the only available form in 
which knowledge is organized. “The Animal That Therefore I 
am” elaborates on Wittgenstein’s concern in the way that, on 
the one hand, it questions the accessibility of alterity from the 
ontological perspective in such statements as “for the other to 
be other it must already be less than other” (Wolfe 2003, 27) 
and “one cannot ‘welcome the other as other’” (Ibid.), on the 
other hand, it challenges the definition of humanity which be-
comes uncertain in human beings’ effort to approach the other 
in such observations as “discourses as original as those of Hei-
degger and Levinas, disrupt, of course, a certain tradition of 
humanism.”
The Romantic literary movement that swept over Europe 
targets at a disruption of tradition in the literary realm: the 
tradition of Neo-Classism. The Romantics’ rebellion against 
tradition requires a new weltanschauung organized not by fol-
lowing the ideal representation of the world embedded in the 
Greco-Hellenic antiquity, but by amplifying the subjective ex-
perience of a lyricized self, who is at the same time indulged in 
and tortured by his/her weltschmerz, solitude and disenchant-
ment, and whose behavior often speaks of an utter defiance of 
and contempt to artificial standards and conventions. In their 
aspiration to be liberated from external social, moral and ide-
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ological restraints, in their constant conflict with established 
institutions, authorities and etiquettes, the Romantic heroes of-
ten engage with a redefinition of the self and the other. Their 
rebellious character and self-imposed nobility tends to alienate 
them from their surroundings for a pursuit of sublimity and 
exceptionality, as a result of which they readily venture into the 
unfamiliar realm of others that might be utilized to reconstruct 
the self. 
In Romantic poetry we see the other in its various repre-
sentations: the animal, the Oriental, the other gender, the other 
religion, and so on, many of which are distinguished by their 
linguistic or communicative traits. In the case of the other as 
the animal, the presence of animal in natural settings in Ro-
mantic poetry complicates the problem of the accessibility of 
nature – the other “other” as opposed to human – especially 
when the animal engages with the Romantic hero when he/she 
takes the flight to nature in his/her search for identification and 
solution, as we see in William Wordsworth’s poem “There was 
a Boy” (later incorporated into “The Prelude”):
…he, as through an instrument, Blew mimic hoot-
ings to the silent owls That they might answer him.—
And they would shout Across the watery vale, and 
shout again, Responsive to his call,—with quivering 
peals, And long halloos, and screams, and echoes 
loud Redoubled and redoubled; concourse wild Of jo-
cund din! And, when there came a pause Of silence 
such as baffled his best skill: Then, sometimes, in 
that silence, while he hung Listening, a gentle shock 
of mild surprise Has carried far into his heart the 
voice Of mountain-torrents; or the visible scene Would 
enter unawares into his mind With all its solemn imag-
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ery, its rocks, Its woods, and that uncertain heaven re-
ceived Into the bosom of the steady lake. (Wordsworth 
1910, vol. 3, 122-123)
Here the boy mimics the voice of the owl, and seeks the “an-
swer” from it, which is “responsive to his call.”. However, the 
responsiveness of the owl between the boy and the animal, as 
Christine Kenyon-Jones indicates, does not necessarily suggest 
the realization of communication between human and nature 
(Kenyon-Jones 2001, British Romanticism and Animals, 139). 
In fact, if one contrasts the owl’s response with its occasional 
reticence, one will find the former equal to the “jocund din,”, 
while it is in the latter occasion that the “voice of mountain-
torrents” enters his heart, and the “visible scene” enters his 
mind. Therefore, the boy’s internalization of nature’s message 
– his receiving of its “imagery,”, his grasp of nature all at once 
– takes place only when the animal becomes silent.
The animal as the other disappears in the larger other, na-
ture, in “There was a Boy.”. This ratifies Kenyon-Jones’s argu-
ment that in Wordsworth’s view it is the inanimate, unifying 
nature that summons the sublimity, while the animate “beasts 
and birds” in their specificity “denied an equal power over his 
spiritual life and vocation” (Kenyon-Jones 2009, 139). She 
quotes Wordsworth’s writing in book 2 of “The Prelude”: “…
for in all things / I saw one life, and felt it was joy. / One song 
they sang, and it was audible...” (Kenyon-Jones 2009, 138). Ke-
nyon-Jones continues to point out that in Bbook 8 Wordsworth 
“makes it clear that he did not in fact regard animals as part of 
Nature at all” (Ibid.). Following her proposition, one may argue 
that the unification and sublimation of nature in Wordsworth’s 
poem requires the “sacrifice,”, if one is allowed to use Derrida’s 
term here, of the specificity and ordinariness of the animal.
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In Derrida’s analysis, while the fixation of animal as a pre-
coded machine without the ability of responding reduces the 
animal and makes “the other less than the other,”, it is rather 
the human solicitation of a response from the animal that “sac-
rifices” it. In other words, the animal ceases to be the other 
once we call it. It cannot respond to our call not because it is 
not equipped with the necessary repertoire or mechanism to 
respond, but because our call is never directed to it. The crux 
of the question here, then, is not whether the animal possesses 
a language, but whether human beings are able to find the oth-
er in the human language. Here one recognizes a dialogue of 
Derrida with Heidegger: If the other, as analyzed in Being and 
Time, is essentially defined not by its distinction from us, but 
by the way of life that it shares with us, by the potential to be 
identified by us as the “they” (das Man) in our common pres-
ent-to-hand experience, then the animal cannot be the other in 
relation to the Being-with (Heidegger 1962, 26: 154-155). What 
this reflection implies is that as soon as the lyric hero starts to 
mimic the call of the owl in order to seek an answer from it, 
the owl as the other vanishes, for it is not from the owl that the 
hero is expecting the answer, but from his own experience that 
comprises the everyday form of his being.
From Derrida’s perspective, the sacrifice of the animal, and 
of the other in general, originates from the problematic nature 
of our quest of the other “as such,”, as Cary Wolfe observes in 
his reading of “The Animal That Therefore I am”:
It is the rejection of “animality in general”, and of sin-
gularity and identity in general, that is amplified con-
siderably in Derrida’s recent lecture…The “Animal, 
what a word!” He exclaims. “[W]ithin the strict enclo-
sure of this definite article (‘the Animal’ and not ‘ani-
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mal’)…are all the living things that man does not rec-
ognize as his fellows, his neighbors or his brothers…” 
For Derrida, this “immense multiplicity of other living 
things…cannot in any way by homogenized, except 
by means of violence and willful ignorance”...It en-
acts what Derrida calls the “sacrificial structure” that 
opens a space for the “non-criminal putting to death” 
of the animal – a sacrifice that…allows the transcen-
dence of the human, of that Heidegger calls “spirit”, by 
the killing off and disavowal of the animal, the bodily, 
the materially heterogeneous, the contingent – in short, 
of Différance. (Wolfe 2003, 22-23)
As a response to “animal, what a word,” Derrida fore-
grounds the neologism “animot” (Wolfe 2003, 121), which is a 
homophone of “animaux,” the plural of “animal.” It is of both 
ontological and ethical significance, as Derrida suggests, to ac-
knowledge the plurality in both human beings and animals, in 
both the selves and the others. We hear the message repeated in 
his polemics with Lacan when he opposes to reducing the “dif-
ferentiated and multiple difference…to one between the human 
subject, on the one hand, and the nonsubject that is the ani-
mal in general, on the other” (Ibid., 128). The foregrounding of 
multiplicity by Derrida is echoed by Ron Broglio in his argu-
ment that the question of animal phenomenology fragments as 
soon as it is raised, for “there is no single animal phenomenol-
ogy” and “each sort of animal carries itself differently on earth 
and fashions a different sort of world” (Broglio 2011, XXII). 
What an “animal phenomenology” contributes to our contact 
with animals is that it opens one’s way to the possibility of 
multiple phenomenologies, to a multifold discovery of variet-
ies of Dasein – from the variety of species to that of breeds to 
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that of individuals – that repeatedly erodes the human/animal 
dichotomy (IIbid.).
In her article “Kindred Brutes: Animals in Romantic-period 
Writing,”, Kenyon-Jones contends that in contrast with the first 
generation of British Romantic poets, in the poetry of the sec-
ond generation “the dividing line between human beings and 
animals becomes no more important than that between differ-
ent kinds of humans or different kinds of animals, and binds 
all animated creatures together through the notion of sympathy 
or compassion” (Kenyon-Jones 2009, 147). She argues that “the 
opposition between ‘Man’ and ‘Nature’ in the earlier, Word-
sworthian, ideology correlates with an emphasis on the need 
for a ‘kindness’ (what Wordsworth calls ‘gentleness’ and ‘ten-
derness’), which actually emphasized the distinctions and dif-
ferences between ‘man’ and ‘brute’. The poets of the second 
Romantic generation, however, in their different ways tended 
to emphasize the consubstantiality, confraternity or kinship of 
humankind with animals, sometimes viewing this as a way of 
expressing political radicalism and defying social convention” 
(Ibid., 148). If one follows Kenyon-Jones’s proposition, then the 
transition from “animal” to “animals” in British Romanticism 
reflects the poets’ growing ethical awareness of the internal 
heterogeneity of the other. What’s more, it draws their attention 
from “the animal” as an element of the nature panorama to the 
life of individual animals, which allows the poets to establish a 
“one to one” relationship with their animals, a relationship that 
allows more space for identification and sympathy and contains 
the potential of being extended to the realm of human beings.
In order to examine the “different others” in the Roman-
tic tradition, it is useful to focus on those occasions when Ro-
mantic poets transport animals from the natural setting to the 
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domestic and social setting, from the alien to the familiar. On 
the one hand, the frequent presence of domestic animals in ev-
eryday life demands a redrawing of boundaries between hu-
man beings and animals that often results in, as Alastair Hunt 
observes, a legislative structure that parallels the division of 
social classes or races, an order that entails the naturalization 
of artificially set hierarchies and privileges that takes advan-
tage of the silenced “others” and legitimizes the rightlessness 
of those who were not capable of representing themselves 
(Hunt 2011, 135). On the other hand, since domestic animals 
have acquired their positions and roles in the social and family 
system, it becomes possible to take animals into account in the 
discussion of social justice and civil rights (instead of project-
ing the social hierarchy on animals, as one does in referring to 
“the animal kingdom”). Moreover, the appeal to liberate ani-
mals from the artificial hierarchies used to justify their appro-
priation also serves to draw attention to other minority groups 
who have suffered negligence, exploitation and violence. As a 
result, literary texts dealing with domestic animals often dem-
onstrate an ethical intensity that rises from the specific political 
and social concerns of the authors. Two examples of domestic 
animals in Romantic poetry are the fish in Alexander Pushkin’s 
“Fountain of Bakhchisarai” and the bull in Canto 1 of Lord 
Byron’s “Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage.”.
As Mikhail Epstein observes, domestic animals frequent 
Pushkin’s poetry (Epstein 1990, 213-214). The image of fish ap-
pears in such poems of Pushkin as “Eugene Onegin,”, “Rusal-
ka”, “Ianysh the Prince” and “The Tale of the Fisherman and 
the Goldfish” (Coyaud 1991, 38). The fish in “The Fountain of 
Bakhchisarai” are captive objects for the amusement of women 
in the harem:
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Беспечно ожидая хана,
Вокруг игривого фонтана
На шелковых коврах оне
Толпою резвою сидели
И с детской радостью глядели,
Как рыба в ясной глубине
На мраморном ходила дне.
Нарочно к ней на дно иные
Роняли серьги золотые.
(Pushkin 1978, vol. 2, 119-120)
The Khan await, in fair array,
Around on silken carpets crowded,
Viewing, beneath a heaven unclouded,
With childish joy the fishes play
And o’er the marble cleave their way,
Whose golden scales are brightly glancing,
And on the mimic billows dancing.
(Pushkin 1849, 11)
Both Monika Greenleaf and Stephanie Sandler point out the 
similarity of the fish to the women in the harem: the fish serve 
as pets and toys for the women; while the women themselves 
live in captivity and under the surveillance of eunuchs (Green-
leaf 1994, 127-128; Sandler 1989, 173). Indeed, one may draw 
further parallels between the image of fish and that of women 
in the poem. In an early stanza Pushkin introduces the wom-
en as Arabic flowers: “Так аравийские цветы / Живут за 
стеклами теплицы” (Pushkin 1978, vol. 2, 118) [As in a hot-
house bloom the flowers / Which erst perfumed Arabia’s field] 
(Pushkin 1849, 7). Here one sees the women as inactive beings 
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through the glass, just as the women, in their turn, observe the 
fish swimming under the surface of the water. The metaphor of 
flower recurs in the poem, as in “цветут в унылой тишине” 
(Pushkin, vol. 2, 118) [bloom in the depressed quiet] (Pushkin 
1849, 7), and in “Я в безмятежной тишине / В тени гарема 
расцветала” (Pushkin 1978, vol. 2, 126) [I in the harem’s quiet 
bloomed] (Pushkin 1849, 23) from Zarema’s soliloquy. More-
over, the fishes’ “walk on the marble bottom” (на мраморном 
ходила дне) and the women’s gesture of “dropping golden ear-
rings to them on the bottom” (к ней на дно…роняли серьги 
золотые) imply the hierarchy of the imperial garden and the 
status of the women in their relation with Girei: he possesses 
both the women and the fish in the harem.
Through the women-fish metaphor, the human-animal hier-
archy parallels the male-female hierarchy in the harem. This 
hierarchy proves crucial in the poem since it brings Zarema 
and Marina, that is, the eastern and western women, together 
(there are, by the way, two different Eastern figures, the Tatar 
Girei and the Georgian Zarema in the poem). In their meeting 
Marina doesn’t understand Zarema’s language, but she vaguely 
perceives her suffering: “Невинной деве непонятен / Язык 
мучительных страстей / Но голос их ей смутно внятен” 
(Puskin 1978, vol. 2, 127) [The innocent maiden understands 
not / The language of tormenting passions / But their voice 
she vaguely receives] (translation mine). Her compassion for 
Zarema arises when she considers her vulnerability in front of 
Girei: “Или кончиной ускоренной / Унылы дни ее пресек, -” 
(Pushkin 1978, vol. 2, 127) [Or that it were her blessed doom 
/ To ‘scape dishonour, life, and pain!] (Pushkin 1849, 27). Za-
rema, on the other side, in her momentary retrieval of Chris-
tian passion empathizes with Marina religiously: “Уж ей пора, 
Марию ждут / И в небеса, на лоно мира, / Родной улыбкою 
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зовут.” (Pushkin 1978, vol. 2, 127) [Her soul is called again 
to heaven, / And angel joys await it there!] (Pushkin 1849, 27).
Their communication without understanding each other’s 
language recalls Derrida’s response to the human/animal di-
vide with language as the boundary: “It would not be a matter 
of ‘giving speech back’ to animals, but perhaps of acceding 
to a thinking, however fabulous and chimerical it might be, 
that thinks the absence of the name and the word otherwise, as 
something other than a privation” (Wolfe 2003, 23). He stresses 
that raising the question of the animal conventionally in terms 
of language or thought “determines so many others concern-
ing power or capability [pouvoir], and attributes [avoir]: be-
ing able, having the power to give, to die, to bury one’s dead, 
to dress, to work, to invent a technique” (Ibid., 24). He offers 
an alternative way of posing the question: “The question is 
disturbed by a certain passivity. It bears witness, manifest-
ing already, as question, the response that testifies to suffer-
ance, a passion, a not-being-able.” He continues: “What of the 
vulnerability felt on the basis of this inability? What is this 
non-power at the heart of power? ... Mortality resides there, as 
the most radical means of thinking the finitude that we share 
with animals, the mortality that belongs to the very finitude of 
life, to the experience of compassion…” (Ibid.) In the interac-
tion between Zarema and Marina, it is the double passivity, 
the double non-power – one towards Girei, and the other to-
wards Christ –that connects them and dissolves the opposition 
between East and West, which retreats onto the background, 
yielding its place to the opposition between two genders, and 
that between human and God.
By highlighting the finitude and incapability as the common 
essence of animals and human beings, Derrida anticipates Bro-
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glio’s proposition that the impossibility of knowing what makes 
an animal from an animal’s perspective reminds human beings 
of their own fragility and impotence (Broglio 2011, XXII). In 
particular, fragility as a “mode of relating to animals” (Ibid.), 
in Wolfe’s words, challenges our habitual gesture of grasping 
and grinding in the acts of knowing and understanding, and 
opens the horizon for a different kind of contact with the oth-
ers that is based on the acknowledgement of the impossibility 
of knowing. By emphasizing the suffering of animals, Derrida 
also returns to Jeremy Bentham’s comment in 1789 that “the 
question (with animals) is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they 
talk? but, Can they suffer?” (Kenyon-Jones 2009, 147) Both 
Bentham and Derrida’s reframing of the question of the animal 
aims at resolving the ethical crisis resulting from the reaction/
response divide suggested by Derrida in his critique of Lacan, 
whose characterization of animals leads one to think that since 
the animal cannot respond, man cannot hold responsibility to-
wards it. In Derrida’s view, however, the mortality that “we 
share with animals” (Wolfe 2003, 24) requires that the com-
mandment “‘Thou shalt not kill”’ concerns not only man.
The animal as the sufferer and as the victim recalls the bull-
fight scene depicted in stanzas 68-80 in Canto I of Lord Byron’s 
“Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage.”. Kenyon-Jones mentions several 
interesting political episodes that background the writing of 
this scene. In 1800 and 1802 the anti-slavery campaigner Wil-
liam Wilberforce and his associates organized several unsuc-
cessful attempts to ban bull-baiting, while in May 1809 Lord 
Erskine, another defender of slavery abolition, introduced a bill 
in the House of Lords “to prevent ‘wanton and malicious cru-
elty’ to domestic animals in general – the first of its kind ever 
to be debated in any Western legislature” (Kenyon-Jones 2001, 
79). According to Kenyon-Jones, Byron heard Erskine’s speech 
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in the House of Lords, in which he had obtained a position 
two months earlier. In July 1809, two months after Erskine’s 
speech, Byron attended the bull-fight near Cadiz, which would 
become the subject of his writing in December that year (Ibid., 
80). 
Byron’s treatment of the bull-fight scene seems to echo these 
initial voices for animal rights. Right after the description of 
bull-fighting we read the narrator’s comment on it: “Such the 
ungentle sport that oft invites / The Spanish maid, and cheers 
the Spanish swain. / Nurtur’d in blood betimes, his heart de-
lights / In vengeance, gloating on another’s pain” (Byron 2008, 
48). The assertion that one gets accustomed to gloating on an-
other’s pain through watching bull-fight presupposes that one 
perceives the suffering of the fighting bull, which is able to ex-
press it during the fight: “distracted with his throes,”, it speaks 
his “woes” through “loud bellowings” (Ibid., 47). What’s more, 
the juxtapositions of nouns and adjectives, as in “dart follows 
dart; lance, lance” (Ibid.) intensify the sense of pain in the scene. 
As one sees the fight unfold, one tends to identify with the bull, 
to follow his movement and to feel his exhaustion, when one 
reads “Foil’d, bleeding, breathless, furious to the last” (Ibid.). 
The identification and compassion culminate when the narrator 
takes the reader into the bull’s body through the line “Where 
his vast neck just mingles with the spine” (Ibid.).
It is worth noticing that Byron reveals compassion not 
only towards the bull, but also towards the horses that suf-
fer from the bull in place of man in the following line: “…
nor more / Can man achieve without the friendly steed, / Alas! 
too oft condemn’d for him to bear and bleed” (Byron 2008, 
46). The abhorrence towards the voyeuristic frenzy reaches 
the utmost intensity in the following lines: “Another, hideous 
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sight! unseam’d appears, / His gory chest unveils life’s pant-
ing source, / Tho’ death-struck still his feeble frame he rears, 
/ Staggering, but stemming all, his lord unharm’d he bears” 
(Ibid., 47). Through these lines Byron made us see both the 
bull and the horses as the sacrifices of human sports. 
In Derrida’s ethical discussion concerning the animal as the 
other, it is significant that the animal “has its point of view re-
garding me” (Wolfe 2003, 27). He illustrates this proposition: 
“The point of view of the absolute other, and nothing will have 
ever done more to make me think through this absolute alter-
ity of the neighbor than these moments when I see myself seen 
naked under the gaze of a cat” (Ibid.). To feel the gaze of the 
animals serves as a key move in his attempt to reassign to us 
our responsibility for them. Romantic poets’ sensitivity to the 
animals’ point of view and its significance in regard to their 
ideological stance has been remarked and analyzed by Peter 
Heymans, who proposes that animals provided Romantic poets 
with an alternative “subjectivity and agency,”, as well as an 
alienating perspective that urges the distribution of our moral 
responsibility into the realm of all other forms of life (Hey-
mans 2012, 14). The gaze, which embodies the animal perspec-
tive, recurs in British Romantic poetry, and the moral message 
contained in it is laid bare in Canto 8 from Shelley’s “Queen 
Mab”, which, as Kenyon-Jones indicates, demonstrates man’s 
recognition of his essential kinship with animals: “No longer 
now / He slays the lamb that looks him the face” (Kenyon-
Jones 2001, 144). 
In Byron’s bull-fight scene the narrator focuses repeatedly 
on the bull’s eyes, in such phrases as “wildly staring,”, “red 
rolls his eye’s dilated glow,”, “his eye is fix’d” (Byron 2008, 
46). If we agree on that the animal’s gaze conveys the impera-
Hui Zhang
74
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 20, Issue 1
tive “Thou shalt not kill,””, then that “the mantle…wraps his 
fierce eye” (Ibid., 47) becomes a symbolic gesture which re-
moves man’s responsibility towards it and approves the kill.
The suffering bull ominously anticipates the suffering hu-
man in the Colosseum scene in stanzas 139-142 of Canto IV. 
Not only does Byron foreground both of them in the respective 
scenes, but the way he presents their death manifests several 
commonalities. Both of them decease with dignity and pride: 
the bull “falls…without a groan, without a struggle” (Byron 
2008, 47); while the gladiator’s “manly brow consents to death, 
but conquers agony” (Ibid., 188). The spectators celebrate the 
death of both: the bull dies “amidst triumphant cries” (Ibid., 
47); while the gladiator falls in “the inhuman shout which 
hail’d the wretch who won” (Ibid., 188).
In an arena where a human being serves as the sacrifice 
for entertainment, the cruelty of “gloating on another’s pain” 
crosses the boundary between human and animal. The bull as 
the “forest-monarch” (Ibid., 44) and the gladiator from the land 
of “young barbarians” (Ibid., 188) share the same vulnerabil-
ity and mortality in front of the “civilized” audience, and they 
die to satiate the same thirst of blood: the “crimson torrent” 
that “streams” (Ibid., 47) from the bull’s flank in the bull ring 
becomes the “bloody stream” that “murder breathed” (Ibid., 
189) in the Colosseum, “where buzzing nations…roar’d or 
murmur’d like a mountain stream dashing or winding as its 
torrent strays” (Ibid.).
In Byron’s view, the sacrifice of both the other as the animal 
and the others as “barbarians” or “slaves” for pleasure origi-
nated from and exacerbated the same moral degeneration. In 
his note to line 1267 of the Colosseum scene he expresses his 
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compassion with the “barbarian” gladiators and implies the sin 
of the spectators who may determine their deaths: “Of these 
(gladiators of different origins) the most to be pitied undoubt-
edly were the barbarian captives; and to this species a Christian 
writer justly applies the epithet ‘innocent’,’ to distinguish them 
from the professional gladiators.” (Ibid., 205). He derogatorily 
mentions Justus Lipsius’s supposition that “the loss of courage, 
and the evident degeneracy of mankind” at the end of Roman 
Empire can be related to “the abolition of…bloody spectacles” 
(Ibid.) in the Colosseum. 
Kenyon-Jones points out that John Hobhouse, who accom-
panied Byron in his visits in Rome, wrote a note to Byron’s 
note to line 1267 in which he refers to Lipsius’s commentary as 
“‘the prototype of Mr. Windham’s panegyric on bull-baiting’” 
(Kenyon-Jones 2001, 84). There he compares William Wind-
ham’s idea that participation in bull-baiting had given British 
men their fighting spirit with the theory that the ‘torrents of 
blood’ shed in the circus had contributed to ancient Roman 
martial greatness” (Ibid.). If Byron knew Windham’s statement 
on bull-baiting, one would suppose that the parallel between 
the bull-fight scene and the Colosseum scene might imply a 
contemporary ethical and political polemic. Indeed, both the 
bull and the gladiator seem to stand for “the every single other” 
with whom Byron sympathizes for their sacrifice on the stage 
of history for the “imperial pleasure”:
…man was slaughtered by his fellow man.
And wherefore slaughtered? wherefore, but because
Such were the bloody Circus’ genial laws,
And the imperial pleasure. – Wherefore not?
What matters where we fall to fill the maws 
Of worms – on battle-plains or listed spot?
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Both are but theatres where the chief actors rot.
(Byron 2008, 188)
These lines extend the continuity between the bull ring and 
the Colosseum to the battle plains. The bull, the gladiator and 
the casualties in wars are ultimately bound by “the mortality 
that belongs to the very finitude of life, to the experience of 
compassion”, an experience that permeates Byron’s reflection 
on historical and contemporary events in “Childe Harold’s Pil-
grimage.” 
The represented animals we have examined - Wordsworth’s 
owl, Pushkin’s fish and Byron’s bull - exemplify how the ques-
tion of animals in Romantic poetry induces ontological, po-
litical and ethical questions about human beings, and how the 
exploration of the other leads to further and more profound 
thinking about ourselves. In the cases of Pushkin and Byron, 
by tracing the other from the level of species to that of ethnic-
ity, community and individual, it seems that these poets had al-
ready taken an ethical move, a move of returning the Derridean 
difference to the “others.”
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